A return to nuclear testing by Washington?
Another treaty
regime put in jeopardy by the plans spelled out in the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Review suggested further
research into the development of a new nuclear warhead, and anticipates a new
generation of nuclear weapons to be deployed starting in 2020. Development of
a new warhead design will require the resumption of nuclear testing, ending
the current international testing moratorium and destroying the CTBT.
The Bush administration’s
disregard of the CTBT precedes the final draft of the NPR. During his presidential
campaign, Bush decided that he would not seek out or support the ratification
of the treaty, which was signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996 but rejected
by the Senate in 1999. Early in his campaign Bush remarked, “It offers
only words and false hopes and high intentions – with no guarantees whatever.
We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with
unwise treaties.”
The Bush administration’s
position has been to uphold the testing moratorium while refusing to support
CTBT ratification. In January 2001, Colin Powell announced during his confirmation
hearing to become secretary of state that the administration would not pursue
CTBT ratification. Nevertheless, he noted, “At the same time President-elect
Bush has indicated he has no intention of resuming testing as part of our efforts.
We do not see any such need for such testing in the foreseeable future.”
However, the United
States took actions toward the end of 2001 that sought to undermine the CTBT.
At the U.N. General Assembly meeting in November, the United States voted against
a resolution submitted annually by Japan, which alluded to continuing the testing
moratorium pending the CTBT’s entry into force. Later that day, the United
States forced a vote on placing the CTBT on the General Assembly agenda. Usually
a procedural decision, the United States purposefully voted against the motion
it proposed to emphasize its disagreement with the treaty.
As a final act
to demonstrate U.S. displeasure with the CTBT, Washington sent no representative
to the November 2001 CTBT Entry into Force Conference. The meeting, which assembled
118 delegations at the United Nations to discuss promoting the CTBT’s entry
into force, revealed the vast international support for enacting a permanent
nuclear testing moratorium. But according to a spokesman for the U.S. representative
to the UN, “We’re just not going to engage.”
The Bush administration
has also announced that it intends to withhold $800,000 in contributions to
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), which is establishing
the monitoring system to verify compliance with the treaty. Further complicating
matters, China and Iran – both named as potential enemies in the leaked
information on the NPR – have withheld seismic data from the CTBTO.
While upholding the self-imposed testing moratorium begun in 1992, administration
officials have indicated that they may consider resuming nuclear testing to
maintain the integrity and safety of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Citing a February
2001 report from a panel on the safety and readiness of the U.S. arsenal, the
NPR suggests reducing the readiness time for nuclear testing from the current
two to three years down to a year or less. The NPR asserts that maintaining
the test ban moratorium “may not be possible for the indefinite future.”
Experts agree that new warhead designs would require testing, noting that it
“seems highly unlikely that designers could certify a low-yield warhead
without actually testing it.”
Preparations for
the resumption of nuclear testing must begin at the laboratories and the test
site by improving personnel expertise and nuclear weapons facilities. During
testimony before the senate, General John Gordon, head of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, elaborated on various needs for his department:
- “… maintain sufficient R&D [research and development] and production
capability to be able to design, develop, and begin production on the order
of five years from a decision to enter full-scale development of a new warhead;”
and
- “… maintain sufficient production capacity to be able to produce
new warheads in sufficient quantities to meet defense requirements”.
In the FY 2003
budget, the Bush administration has begun its plan to prepare for renewed testing
to develop new nuclear weapons. The administration requested $15 million to
reduce the test site readiness time in the FY 2003 budget request for the Energy
Department. A similar attempt to fund test site readiness failed in 2001 in
congress.
In addition to
attempts to codify the NPR’s recommendations in the proposed budgets for
the Defence and Energy Departments, discussions are taking place among administration
officials about outright withdrawal from the CTBT. Opinions are sharply divided
because withdrawal of the U.S. signature will undoubtedly prompt outcry from
the U.S. public, congress and key allies. The U.S. withdrawal from the International
Criminal Court agreement in April 2002 – and the subsequent international
reaction – is pointed to as a potential precedent for attempting such a
move with the CTBT.