Problems tackling the stark proliferation threat
posed by Russia’s vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons

One possible detrimental consequence of the new U.S. nuclear weapons would be the additional influence it would have on pro-nuclear advocates in Russia. This group’s influence within the Russian military has had powerful consequences in the post-Cold War era. In an effort to make up for the qualitative and quantitative deficiencies of its conventional armed forces, Russia abandoned its no-first-use (of nuclear weapons) policy in 1993. In 2000, the nuclear threshold seemed to be further lowered as Russia’s new Military Doctrine stated that Moscow reserved the right to use nuclear weapons “in response to large-scale aggression utilising conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” While such doctrines are largely conceptual and have limited practical implications, the wording still suggested a worrying shift.

However, over the last couple of years President Vladimir Putin appears to have steered the Russian military away from such a path of increased national security reliance on nuclear weapons. This manifested itself in the way Putin resolved the very public and long-running clash between the chief of the general staff, General Anatoly Kvashnin and the defence minister, Igor Sergeyev, over the future of Russian nuclear forces. General Kvashnin argued that funds should be shifted to ailing conventional forces while Sergeyev maintained that Russia's nuclear forces were needed to preserve a global leadership role and must therefore receive funding priority. Putin supported General Kvashnin’s arguments – at an August 2000 meeting of the Russian Security Council it was decided to shift funds from the Strategic Rocket Forces to conventional weapons procurement – and, in March 2001, Sergeyev was replaced as defence minister.

Despite this new direction, large elements within the Russian military establishment are keen to return the emphasis to the nuclear arsenal. Indeed, there are reports that various Russian officials have, for some time now, been calling for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons to threaten underground targets. These ideas have no high-level sanction and remain unfunded. Nonetheless, any development of new nuclear weapons by the United States could change this situation and increase the Russian military’s interest in maintaining and further developing its own nuclear arsenal. This would be disastrous to efforts to control and eventually eliminate Russian tactical weapons.

Many policymakers in the United States have voiced their concern over the proliferation threat posed by Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal, estimated to number between 4,000 and 12,000 warheads. As Representative Curt Weldon, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, recently stated, the “real concern [is that] tactical nukes basically are subject to proliferation and internal theft, internal activities within Russia. We can’t let these kinds of weapons get into the wrong hands, because they are in some cases very portable, more mobile in some cases, than a strategic nuke.”

President George W. Bush has stressed that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is one of the main objectives of his administration. However, no arms agreement has been proposed and administration officials have been quiet on the issue. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton said the United States was “willing to discuss tactical nukes” with Russia, but does not consider them a top priority.

A treaty on tactical nuclear weapons represents a complex challenge, requiring widespread elimination of such weapons and verification measures to be carried out while simultaneously addressing national security concerns on both sides. The difficulty of the task would only increase if the Bush administration develops new nuclear weapons. With renewed emphasis on nuclear arsenals and technologies in both Russia and the United States, the possibility of reductions in tactical nuclear warheads would disappear rapidly.

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